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ABSTRACT 
The present article tries to delimit the concepts of theory of language and general 
linguistics as well as to establish their place within the theory of knowledge. Theory of 
language itself is a deductive construct which supplies both universal concepts and 
modes of speaking whereas general linguistics acts inductively by formulating and 
verifying general hypotheses. Theory of language is not part of general linguistics; 
instead, being a prior knowledge to the latter, it is framed within the philosophy of 
science. 
Based on Vico’s and Dilthey’s theories, the authors propound general linguistics as a 
cultural science or a human science (Geisteswissenschaft) as compared to natural 
sciences and auxiliary sciences. The object of general linguistics is a product of the 
human spirit and is mainly based on the relationships of meaning and sense explained 
from an opposite perspective. If the evolution of linguistic thought is examined, one 
can clearly observe the consequences that confusing the object of general linguistics 
with that of natural sciences, and of confusing the explanations of general linguistics 
and natural sciences, have had on the intellectual currents and schools of the last 
century. 
 
Key Words: THEORY OF LANGUAGE, LINGUISTICS, NATURAL / AUXILIARY / 
CULTURAL SCIENCES, CIRCLE OF UNDERSTANDING, WORLDVIEW, SYNCHRONY / 
DIACHRONY. 
                     
1 M. Loma-Osorio Fontecha has translated this article from Spanish into English. The 
three above-mentioned authors have also reviewed the meaning of the whole paper. 
They would all like to thank Ms Veronica Mayer, M.A. candidate at Columbia University, 
New York, for the final linguistic review of the article. 
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RESUMEN 
Este trabajo pretende delimitar los conceptos Teoría del Lenguaje y Lingüística General 
y establecer su lugar dentro de la Teoría de las Ciencias. La Teoría del Lenguaje es una 
construcción deductiva que provee de conceptos y modos universales sobre el hablar, 
mientras que la Lingüística General actúa inductivamente formulando y verificando 
hipótesis de carácter general. La Teoría del Lenguaje no forma parte de la Lingüística 
General, sino que, siendo un saber previo a ésta, se encuadra dentro de la Filosofía de 
las Ciencias.  
Tomando como base el pensamiento de Vico y de Dilthey, se propone una Lingüística 
General como Ciencia de la Cultura o del espíritu (Geisteswissenschaft), frente a las 
Ciencias de la Naturaleza y las Ciencias Auxiliares. Su objeto es producto del espíritu 
humano y tiene como base predominantemente las relaciones de significado y sentido, 
explicadas de manera opositiva. Si examinamos el devenir del pensamiento lingüístico, 
se muestran las consecuencias que ha tenido, en las corrientes y escuelas lingüísticas 
del último siglo, el hecho de confundir: 1) el objeto de la Lingüística General con los 
objetos de las Ciencias de la Naturaleza, y 2) las explicaciones de la primera con las 
explicaciones causales, propias de las Ciencias de la Naturaleza. 
 
Palabras clave: TEORÍA DEL LENGUAJE, LINGÜÍSTICA, CIENCIAS DE LA 
NATURALEZA/AUXILIARES/DE LA CULTURA, CÍRCULO EN LA COMPRENSIÓN, 
COSMOVISIÓN, SINCRONÍA/DIACRONÍA. 
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Der Mensch spricht nicht etwa nur in Wachvollzug seines Daseins, sondern 
ebenso auch in Traumvollzug. Er spricht nicht dann und wann, sondern stets. 
Stets aber nicht nur dann, wenn er seine Rede verlauten lässt, sondern er 
spricht im Wachen und Träumen auch dann, wenn er kein Wort verlauten lässt. 
In Wachvollzug seines Daseins lässt er insbesondere dann kein Wort verlauten, 
wenn er der verlautenden Rede eines anderen schweigend zuhört oder wenn er 
Geschriebenes schweigend liest. Das legt die Vermutung nahe, dass wir nur 
deshalb auch im schweigenden Zuhören und Lesen sprechen, weil wir uns darin 
mit gesprochener und geschriebener Sprache verstehend befassen. Man möchte 
daher meinen, wir sprechen dann nicht, wenn wir weder Worte verlauten lassen 
noch uns gesprochener und geschriebener verstehend zuwenden, sondern uns 
schweigsam einer Arbeit oder einfachen Verrichtung widmen oder aber von 
solchen Tätigkeiten ausruhen und der Muße pflegen. Stattdessen sprechen wir 
auch in diesen Daseinssituationen. Der Mensch spricht immer und in allen 
Feldern seines Daseins, wenn au ch die Weisen seines Sprechens nicht 
einförmig, sondern mannigfaltig sind. Dass wir in allen Vollzugsweisen unseres 
Daseins sprechen -auch da wo wir es gewöhnlich nicht vermuten– deutet darauf 
hin, dass Sprechen in diesem weiten und umfassenden Sinne uns natürlich ist. 
Was uns natürlich ist, gehört zu unserer Natur, zu unserem Wesen, zum Wesen 
des Menschen. Was zum Wesen des Menschen gehört, bestimmt ihn von Grund 
auf, kann nicht erst das Ergebnis eines Willensaktes sein, sondern bestimmt ihn 
schon vor jedem Willensakt. Mit all dem ist jetzt nur darauf hingewiesen, wie 
das Sprechen und die Sprache das Selbst- und Weltverständnis des Menschen 
wesensmäßig bestimmt. Offen bleibt noch, was denn das Sprachliche in allen 
Vollzugsweisen des Selbst- und Weltverständnisses ist. 
MARTIN HEIDEGGER 
 
 
1. THEORY OF LANGUAGE AND GENERAL LINGUISTICS. 
 If speaking is all that the above-cited philosopher, M. Heidegger, 
shows and suggests it to be, there is not a harder task than speaking of 
speaking (el hablar). This is the reason why, before beginning any 
interpretation about of the definition of speaking (el hablar) as “our ability 
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to communicate with someone intentionally in an articulate manner”, we 
intend to clearly delineate the notions of “theory of language” and “general 
linguistics” as a prior necessary foundation2
1) Theory of language and general linguistics are fields that constitute the 
general framework of all linguistic disciplines. Therefore, we must start 
from a very deep level of abstract thought so that we can fully clarify 
what specifically constitutes their object. 
 to the study of any historical 
language. From our point of view, these two notions require a double-
sided consideration: 
2) On the other hand, it is an accepted philosophical fact that all 
sciences-whether they are natural, cultural, or auxiliary- have 
elaborated their methods adapting them to their specific object of 
investigation, to what has been called their formal object, at least since 
Aristotelian medieval Scholastics. As a consequence, a particular 
conception of the object of study necessarily implies a specific 
methodology, different from any other and required by a distinct 
conception of the same object of investigation. 
 The concept of theory of language expounded so many times at 
the Romance Seminar of Tübingen University by Prof. Eugenio Coseriu 
(†) is not part of historical languages but rather a part of the philosophy 
of science. This would describe and define the place of the study of 
                     
2 Please notice that the title of this series is precisely: Lorenzo Hervás. Fundamentos 
del Lenguaje. Foundations of Language, Fondements du Langage. Sprachgrundlagen. 
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historical languages within the scope of scientific activities. 
Consequently, historical languages are not the object of study of theory 
of language; on the contrary, that object can be found at a deeper level 
of investigation, just before studying the descriptions of the specific 
historical languages. 
 Unlike this conception, Th. Lewandovski ((1985, 4., neu 
bearbeitete Aufl.) p. 1012 and thereafter), defines linguistic theory as: 
„eine über die Grammatiktheorie nicht nur additiv hinausgehende 
Theoriebildung, die allgemeine anthropologische, soziologische, 
psychologische, sprachverwendungs- und handlungsorientierte, 
synchrone und diachrone sowie allgemeine wissenschaftstheoretische 
Komponenten zu integrieren hat"3
 If this descriptive definition, whose literalness we have chosen to 
maintain, were to be accepted, then one should conclude, as has been 
done repeatedly, that in fact no theory of language exists, nor could it 
possibly exist. The practical reason for this must be found in the 
researchers’ zeal to invade a scientific field wider than what is attainable 
or desirable, or in not having distinguished what in Europe has been 
clear since G. B. Vico, namely the division of sciences into natural 
. 
                     
3 “A theoretical formation that goes beyond the theory of grammar not only in an 
additive manner, given that it has to integrate general anthropological, sociological, 
and psychological components, as well as those of linguistic use and those oriented to 
action both synchronic and diachronic, along with general components of the theory of 
science.” 
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sciences, cultural sciences and sciences of formalization. In fact, stating 
the limits of theory of language as opposed to the other sciences cannot 
be the formal object of study of linguistics but instead of the philosophy 
of science. 
 This point was ignored by A. N. Chomsky ((1957), p. 49) as he 
stated that “A grammar of language L is essentially a theory of language 
L” (cf. V. Báez San José (1973), § 3.0.), that is, the then-young M.I.T. Ph. 
D. regarded the cultural as natural. He thus took a definitive step 
towards natural sciences, since the observed aspects were not explained 
within a freely-stated field but one ruled by a set of laws and 
restrictions. This implied taking L. Bloomfield’s theory (1933) to its 
furthest consequences since he had adopted the psychological 
framework of Watson’s behaviorism and rejected everything which was 
not “directly observable” for linguistic analysis. Therefore, within the 
study of language, the semantic aspect was considered a useful intuition 
even though it could not be scientifically studied. Given that, if speaking 
is not communicating with someone intentionally in an articulate 
manner, one must also reject, along with L. Bloomfield and his 
followers, the essential aspects of communication within linguistics. 
These are: meaning, sense (the combination of non-contradictory 
meanings) and reference (not only of nouns and proforms4
                     
4 Manuals talk about “reference” only and exclusively when they know for sure that 
nouns and pronouns relate to objects in an extra-linguistic reality. From our point of 
 but 
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principally of sentence structures patterns, utterances and, naturally, of 
their corresponding speech acts to the phenomena understood as facts 
in whose manifestation our speaking ability, that is, our ability to 
communicate with someone intentionally in an articulate manner, is 
exhausted). 
  The dichotomy theory of language / general linguistics must also 
not be connected with the one established by F. de Saussure, langue / 
parole. More than thirty years ago, Báez San José (1975,p.24), in 
agreement with the Polish linguist Witold Manczak (1969), stated that 
the difference between langue and parole was primarily quantitative and 
that the qualitative differences stated by Saussure should not be 
admitted, nor should those established by Chomsky. Saussure considers 
the so-called langue only and exclusively as a system of signs whose 
realizations are the strings of parole. This is merely a brilliant term 
accepted by most linguists for between this theoretical concept and 
praxis there is a contradiction which could be exemplified as follows: 
Botany studies plants but not Mendel’s laws. Only linguistics would 
study a supposed theoretical object, a system of abstract signs, but 
really, unlike what Saussure suggests, it deals with texts and their 
                                                            
view, reference truly exists when what is conceived as an event (real, possible or 
impossible), that is, when a sentence structure pattern, realized as an utterance, 
becomes a speech act. See Valerio Báez San José (1987, 1990-1991, 1991, 1993, 
1994a, 1994b, 1994c, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2002, 2003, 2005) and Valerio Báez San José, 
Guillermo Fernández Rodríguez-Escalona and Marciana Loma-Osorio Fontecha (2008). 
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understanding, as will be seen shortly. Saussure’s position is in itself a 
contradiction and follows, according to Manczac, the antinomies of 
mutability/immutability, grammar/vocabulary, synchrony/diachrony, 
langue/parole- that is, a dualist primitive way of thinking. Just as for a 
physicist there are not two different realities heat-cold, light-darkness, 
humidity-dryness, speed-slowness, etc., there cannot really be two 
different realities for a linguist. All scientific progress is a transition 
from dualism to monism (for instance, the theory of relativity that 
reduces space, time, mass and energy to a same denominator). 
 Finally, we believe that a linguist should explain the fact that 
somebody communicates with someone else intentionally in an 
articulate manner and this other person/oneself can understand 
him/her, at least partially. This is the reason why we call our linguistic 
theory “From Speaking to Linguistic Systems” (“Desde el Hablar a las 
Lenguas”). However, building a linguistics of the real linguistic 
competence of a historical community is, logically, a subsequent activity 
to knowing what the place of linguistics is, as opposed to other 
sciences, within a general theory of science. 
 We do not state that the so-called “theory of language” is a more 
abstract term that includes partial theories, syntax theory, semantic 
theory, phonological theory, etc. We do not here defend that the 
essential components of theory of language are linguistic description, 
linguistic change, language acquisition (L1, L2,… etc.), linguistic 
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functions etc. As will be explained throughout our future articles, all this 
confusion comes from the non-distinction between speaking (el hablar) 
and linguistic systems. 
  On the other hand, if theory of language were the integration of 
several partial theories into a comprehensive one, one would first have 
to make clear the criteria adopted for the integration, and also state the 
essential reasons why theory of language should be considered a 
discipline distinct from others. 
  As well as theory of language, we must also consider the concept 
of general linguistics. The latter is necessarily intra-linguistic, i.e. once we 
know the essentials of linguistic systems and their realizations through 
linguistic theory and the possible levels of linguistic research, if we 
compare them among themselves, we can inductively make 
generalizations or even foresee units and universal relationships as 
hypotheses. Fundamentally, we intend to recognize the science designed 
by Georg von der Gabelentz in the 19th century and apply to it the 
principles of inductive study designed by J. M. Bochensky in the 20th 
century. 
 This problem we are posing again has already got a tradition within 
the history of the theory which we are dealing with. In fact, V. Báez San 
José (1975, pp. 152-154), interpreting several generativist studies, stated: 
1) J. J. Katz (1967, pp. 126-127), then an interpretative semanticist, 
described the theory of the existence of linguistic universals in the 
Theory of Language and General Linguistics.  
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following way: a) organizational universals, which determine the abstract 
structure of the subcomponents of the grammatical description and the 
relationships among them; b) universals which determine the abstract 
formal structure of the types of rules of each subcomponent of a 
grammar, and c) substantive universals, which specify the theoretical 
vocabulary which provides the elements (constructs) for the formation of 
specific rules that might show the formal structure required by formal 
universals. 
2) how in other authors more or less framed within generativism it was 
theoretically upheld: 
A) J. Lyons (1966): noun, predicate and sentence can be classified as 
universals while other features and categories are different in all 
languages, 
B) E. Bach (1965): there is a universal set of transformations that each 
language carries out in a different way, 
C) M. A. K. Halliday (1966): the universal deep structure is a linguistic 
universal, 
D) Ch. J. Fillmore (1968): there is a universal system of semantic cases 
which determine the deep structure of any natural language, and finally 
E) E. Bach (1968): nouns, adjectives and verbs, which could be considered 
natural categories within the generativist terminology, are identical in the 
deep structures of all languages. 
  All this presupposed, even though at the time it was not so clear to 
Theory of Language and General Linguistics.  
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scholars, a confusion between theory of language and general linguistics. 
One of our first attempts to solve this problem was a return to the 
medieval Scholastics. According to this school, there was an ante rem 
universal which was the essence of the thing itself or, from a Platonic 
perspective, the absolute reality of the ideal being. The in re universal 
referred to the set of real characteristics of real things (res); and the post 
rem universal was the set of properties which the researcher inductively 
drew from abstractions, starting from the phenomenon of reality. All this 
is even clearer in the Spanish Renaissance Scholastics. When Melchor Cano 
(1563, 1-9, c.7) states precisely: 
Res sunt singulares, ideae vero rerum sunt essentialiter universales; res 
sunt contingentes, mutabiles, transitoriae; ideae autem sunt 
necessariae, inmutabiles, aeternae; res sunt concretae et determinatae 
quoad omnes suas circunstantias, ideae vero sunt abstractae et a 
circunstanctiis praescindunt. 
 The concept of theory of language is present here since trying to 
delimit it in relation to other sciences is nothing but some way delimiting, 
not defining, ante rem universals. According to the Scholastic’s thesis: 
Universale formale fit per operationem intellectus; et quidem universale 
formale directum per meram praecisionem mentis; formale logicum vel 
relativum per comparationem reflexivam naturae abstractae cum 
individuis. 
 It is clear from this that the concept of theory of language comes 
Theory of Language and General Linguistics.  
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from the formal universal and the direct formal universal. On the other 
hand, the concept of general linguistics, as Georg von der Gabelentz has 
clearly stated, emerges from a logical or relative formal method if we 
make abstract comparisons with the elements. 
 It is curious to see how J. M. Bochensky (1965, p. 92) has proposed 
a method analogous to the Scholastics’, a deductive-inductive method of 
discernment, scientific, empirical, exact and objective, in four steps: 
1) observation of the data (the empirical step), 
2) involved analysis of the structure of the data (the intelligence 
step), not mechanical, intuitive, based on the data but helped by the 
foundations, formation and intelligence of the analyst, who is able to 
generalize, compare and identify the regularities in the data collected 
if there are enough of them to be analyzed, 
3) formulation of a hypothesis (exact step in which the results of the 
discovery made when we get deeper into the data are formulated in 
an exact way, according to a given theory which provides new terms 
and general modes), and 
4) verification of the hypothesis (objective step consisting of a 
mechanical checking in which the results should be independent 
from the subjective stance of the analyst and verifiable by another 
analyst using the same data and methods). 
As a conclusion, theory of language is one that, in accordance with point 
3), provides universal and general terms and modes, whereas general 
Theory of Language and General Linguistics.  
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linguistics could be defined as the formulation of a hypothesis in 
accordance with induced data and the verification of this hypothesis. In 
fact, we are dealing with the construction of two different mechanisms: 
theory of language, a deductive mechanism; and general linguistics, an 
inductive mechanism that leads to a verified hypothesis. 
 
2. THE PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLE. 
 
2.1. NATURAL SCIENCES AND CULTURAL SCIENCES. 
 From the point of view of the philosophy of science, we can divide 
the set of human scientific knowledge, as G.B. Vico’s cyclic conception did 
- shown currently within the field of language sciences by E. Coseriu 
(1968)- into three main groups: natural, auxiliary and cultural sciences. 
The basis of this distinction is the following: 
 1) In natural sciences, the material object of investigation, or at 
least the primary elements that necessarily constitute this object, 
preexists, that is, it has not been created by man. He just strives to 
explain it formally by means of the general principle of causality, i.e. the 
search ends when the necessary cause of the explained phenomenon is 
found. Consequently, all natural science is necessarily predictive. 
Theory of Language and General Linguistics.  
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 That is the reason why all the generativist5
                     
5 See Valerio Báez San José (1975), where the author points out that what is called 
“generative grammar” was originally just a simple theory about the formal description 
of a language. The founders and followers of this theory have 1. Added some 
components, or 2. Varied their order, or 3. Both 1 and 2 at the same time. 
, postgenerativist and 
cognitive efforts to make a predictive grammar were and still are ab ovo 
failing. Both generativists and postgenerativists have not taken into 
account that, when there is freedom, there could be an oppositive 
system but not a law of cause and effect and vice versa; a predictive 
model, identical to the one supported by the historicists in the 19th 
century, who, after creating phonetic laws, also forgot about the 
aforementioned model, up to the present. Thus we can say, explaining, 
yes, prophesying, obviously not. We agree with predictivity, if being 
predictive implies a theory of language whose objective would be the 
formulation of a series of hypotheses that account for the universal and 
general features that languages and their manifestation, speaking (el 
hablar), may have. We must then test if these components and universal 
and/or general elements correspond to the real data collected. 
Otherwise, we should reformulate new hypotheses which incorporate the 
results not clearly foreseen in the first hypothesis. This is a 
hypothetical-deductive working method. We must also take into account 
that the series of initial hypotheses cannot by themselves account for 
the way “speaking” works here and now but rather for the whole system 
Theory of Language and General Linguistics.  
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constructed to explain these current data which, as free cultural 
products, undergo the creative transformation by the speaker. 
 In natural sciences there is no place for human freedom since a 
given phenomenon occurs as a consequence of a sufficient cause and 
there is no other one that may counteract it. Natural sciences are 
consequently sciences of the necessary. The pertinent features of these 
fields of scientific investigation are: a) the preexistence of the object itself, 
or as a previous element; and b) its causal explanation. 
 2) On the contrary, in auxiliary sciences or rather formal sciences, 
mathematics and logic, the phenomenological object does not preexist, 
either in whole or in part. Actually, numbers, variables, magnitudes, 
points, lines etc. do not have a prior existence except as the researcher’s 
a priori elements or structures. Furthermore, what is based on the above-
mentioned a priori elements or structures follows a set of rules which 
completely fulfill the principles of all scientific knowledge: the principles 
of identity and non-contradiction. As a consequence, there is no material 
object for these sciences, and the explanation consists of the inner 
creation of the simple or complex object, which must be ruled by 
necessary principles. It must be considered, on the other hand, that all 
scientific investigation of a natural or cultural object should be explained 
either mathematically or logically or mathematically and logically. We must 
remember that the mathematical or the logical object does not exist by 
itself. Nonetheless, the formalized explanation of any scientific object 
Theory of Language and General Linguistics.  
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cannot be contradictory logically and/or mathematically. 
 3) In cultural sciences, we find objects which are radically 
different. Indeed, a cultural fact exists prior to any investigation but in a 
free and voluntary way. If we relate some specific elements in the 
appropriate proportions and adequate conditions, a determined caused 
effect cannot be guaranteed to be obtained. 
 
2.2. AN ATTEMPT TO FIND THE FOUNDATIONS OF CULTURAL SCIENCES. 
Our conception of cultural sciences ultimately comes from G. B. 
Vico, nonetheless, our mentor has been W. Dilthey. In fact, since the 
latter integrated all the experiences and processes of human 
comprehension-including sciences, which all have the same origin- he 
could focus on the development of the differences between the so-
called natural sciences (Naturwissenschaften) and cultural sciences or 
“sciences of the spirit” (Geisteswissenschaften), these latter few being 
historically oriented. A basic point of Dilthey’s position is that natural 
sciences explain processes (Vorgänge) which exist in nature, whereas 
cultural sciences try to understand (verstehen) historical-cultural events. 
It implies that the concept of understanding involves experiencing in 
oneself, at the same time, another’s and one’s own being, Dasein, as it 
is expressed in writing, languages, gestures, mimicking, art, etc. and, 
evidently in speaking (das Sprechen). This understanding is not carried 
out passively by simply using symbols. It demands an active experience. 
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The late Dilthey formulated (1910) another outline for the 
explanation of “sciences of the spirit” (Geisteswissenschaften): 
experiencing, understanding, expressing. The normal difference 
between natural and cultural sciences attributed to our author is the 
following: 
NATURAL SCIENCES: EXPLAINING SCIENCES OF THE SPIRIT: UNDERSTANDING 
 
THE OBJECT IS NATURE. 
 
THIS IS THE ONLY ONE THAT CAN BE 
INVESTIGATED AND OBSERVED. 
SUPPOSITIONS ABOUT THE CAUSE OF 
NATURAL PROCESSES ARE 
FORMULATED. 
IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO REPEAT THE 
EXPERIENCE (Nach-Erleben). 
THE OBJECT IS THE PRODUCTS OF HUMAN SPIRIT. 
THESE CAN BE UNDERSTOOD SINCE MAN HIMSELF 
HAS CREATED THEM. 
 
NATURAL PROCESSES ARE CONCEIVED 
AS SPECIAL CASES OF A GENERAL 
ABSTRACT LAW. 
THE OBJECTS OF INVESTIGATION OF “SCIENCES OF 
THE SPIRIT” ARE CONCEIVED IN THEIR 
RELATIONSHIPS TO EACH OTHER6. 
THE SCIENTIFIC UNDERSTANDING OF 
“THE NATURAL” IS NEUTRAL WITH 
REGARD TO ITS OBJECT OF 
INVESTIGATION AND HAS LITTLE 
IMPORTANCE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF PERSONALITY. 
THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE EXISTENCE (DASEIN) 
OF DIFFERENT PAST CULTURES AND 
PERSONALITIES LEADS TO ONE’S 
TRANSFORMATION. THE OTHER’S SPIRITUAL 
CONTENTS ARE INTEGRATED IN ONE’S OWN’S 
SPIRITUAL CONTENTS IN AN ACTIVE WAY. 
AN EXPLANATION WITHIN THE FIELD 
OF NATURAL SCIENCES IS VERIFIABLE. 
 
THE KNOWLEDGE OF “SCIENCES OF THE SPIRIT” 
CANNOT BE VERIFIED. IN CASE WE COULD 
ENTIRELY UNDERSTAND SOMETHING CULTURAL, IT 
WOULD BE PRACTICALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO BE 
ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN ABOUT THE FULL NATURE 
OF SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING. 
                     
6 Here we find a well-foreseen concept of opposition. 
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As has already been mentioned, Dilthey aligns himself with the 
hermeneutic tradition of Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher. In fact, 
Schleiermacher was the first one to free hermeneutics (see Frank, M., 
ed.,1977, and principally F. Schleiermacher, 2000) from the mere 
Method for Interpretation of Text and to leave it generally open to the 
field of understanding. In this way Dilthey developed the viewpoint in 
which it is not only the word itself that finds meaning in relation to the 
text, but the discourse/reasoning, the literary genre, the division into 
chapters, … must also be taken into consideration. According to Dilthey, 
this expansion is necessarily extended to all expressions of human life 
(Lebensäußerungen). Consequently, the meaning of a cultural 
phenomenon will always depend on the context and can never be 
absolute. Human gestures, works of art, architectural styles, laws, order, 
rules, and religious conceptions can only be understood within a sense 
relationship (Sinnzusammenhang). 
It is precisely at this point where the conception of those who 
know directly or indirectly Dilthey’s thought and our own perspective 
start differing. For most semanticists, who call themselves 
functionalists, without previously defining, apart from some exceptions, 
what a “function” is, “sense” is an intuition of the whole7
                     
7 In the last 6th International Congress on Hispanic Linguistics held for the last time at 
Leipzig University by the great Hispanist Prof. Dr. Gerd Wotjak in the l Institut fur 
Sprach- und Übersetzungswissenschaft, 8-12 October 2003, 1.The first author of this 
article stated in a public session that the so-called textual linguistics of a functionalist 
. As far as we 
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are concerned- taking into account that sense necessarily implies a 
determined context- “sense” in a text could be defined as the product of 
a non-contradictory combination of the categorial, lexical and, 
eventually, grammatical meanings which are undertaken in a discourse, 
whose product is the text itself (see the discussion on these three terms 
in V. Báez San José, 2002, chp. 3.2., pp. 56-60). This has to be so 
because the only thing a human mind cannot understand, as we see it, 
is something contradictory in itself. We cannot clearly state that an 
intuition of the whole may or even could arise. On the contrary, this 
intuition of the whole is only understandable and adequate insofar far as 
it is exactly compatible with the non-contradictory combination of the 
elements of the different communicative levels. 
On the other hand, this call to intuition by the idealists with a 
solid philosophical background such as K. Vossler and L. Spitzer, or 
even by Dámaso Alonso (see : V. Báez San José, 1972, and the review by 
Leo Spitzer, 1952 to Dámaso Alonso, Poesía Española…) was just the 
non-formalized understanding of the aforementioned combination. 
Consequently, the issue of what is called the “circle of 
understanding” (Hermeneutischer Zirkel) stops having, as we see it, a 
                                                            
tendency was presented as linguistics of sense. 2. He also stated clearly that he had 
not found a single sufficient definition of the term, if we understand by “sufficient” the 
definition made according to a criterion of a close genus and differentia. 3. It was 
asked of the present linguists an approach to arrive at the required definition. There 
was no answer. 
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merely intuitive value. In fact, if, after a non-scientific audition or a 
reading, the whole is conceived as something intuitive and the particular 
as something understandable by its relationship with that whole, then 
we presuppose and pre-admit that the whole is previously known and, 
furthermore, that the knowledge of the specific elements comes from 
the whole itself, and, finally, that the understanding of it depends on the 
particular aspects integrated in a unit. Dilthey sorted out this problem 
saying that all current knowledge lies on a prior knowledge 
(Vorverständnis). Sense structures for Dilthey are relationships situated 
ahead of the isolated elements. This thought is clearly expressed by this 
author in his famous formula: daß das Denken nicht hinter das Leben 
zurückgehen kann (Thought cannot go behind life). 
We agree with Dilthey that raw data (Rohdaten), which are primary 
data absolutely free from any pre-interpretation, cannot be found either 
in natural sciences or in cultural sciences. In fact, from the classic Greek 
thought, each first observation and choice of the objects of natural and 
cultural sciences lies, implicitly or explicitly, on a pre-knowledge of 
things. On the other hand, all meaning is a set of features historically 
gathered as part of a whole. Nonetheless, constructions which we call 
terminological constructions within natural sciences or cultural 
constructions are both syntagmatic combinations. Consequently, we 
must not confuse “sense” with the system of elements at a specific level 
of description nor can we confuse “sense” with a globalizing intuition. 
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Initially, Dilthey considered life-shaping experience (erleben) as 
the foundation of hermeneutics and understanding (verstehen) as the 
psychological concerned penetration into an author’s mental processes. 
Later he abandoned this psychological point of view and focused on the 
concepts of “expression” and “understanding” as the main focus of 
cultural sciences methodology, whose main purpose would be to clarify 
the relationship between experiencing (erleben), expressing (Ausdruck) 
and understanding (verstehen). In this process, the expression, or rather 
the objectivation of the general spirit (Geist) of an age should be 
considered as a manifestation of the vital impulses of some author(s) or 
artist(s). 
In other words, the circle of understanding (Das Zirkel im 
Verstehen) implies: 1) The formation of preconceptions or anticipations 
(Vorurteilen, Vorwegnahmen), that is, anticipatory interpretations of the 
meaning of a text or a piece of that text. 2) The subsequent elaboration 
of an idea on the text or on part of it, a process which may lead to the 
change of the first preconceptions, following these steps: a) the 
hermeneutic draft: the blending of the horizon of understanding and the 
horizon of meaning, b) the hermeneutic experience: the pre-conception 
is developed and corrected, c) the final draft is improved: deeper 
understanding and elaboration of the pre-knowledge. This process can 
be repeated ad infinitum. 
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2.3. CIRCLE OF UNDERSTANDING AND WORLDVIEW. 
Closely connected to the process of the hermeneutic circle is the 
concept of Weltanschauung (Worldview), which has been often 
connected to W. von Humboldt’s thought. However, we have never 
explicitly found such a connection. It seems to have been documented 
first in I. Kant (1790, Part I, Book II, (§ 26)), where the main topic is 
founding the aesthetic feeling. The analysis of the sublime means that 
worldview, which is an absolute general term, is the capacity to bring an 
aesthetic-receptive vision into the ordinary world. This perspective is an 
endless multifaceted phenomenon, but this process of conceptual 
transformation does not coincide in Kant with any decisive systematic 
meaning. 
German Romanticism used this idea as a weapon against the 
rationalism of the Enlightenment. Gradually subjective feeling became a 
focus of interest: one’s personal perspective of the world was a 
summation not only of comprehensive rational knowledge but also of 
experience and feelings. 
Schleiermacher stated in 1813 in Vorlesungen über Pädagogik: „Es 
ist die Weltanschauung eines jeden, worin die Totalität aller Eindrücke 
zu einem vollständigen Ganzen des Bewusstseins bis auf den höchsten 
Punkt gesteigert, [...] gedacht wird.“ [What one thinks is each person’s 
worldview, in which the totality of all impressions is intensified towards 
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a whole consciousness till the summit is reached]. Consequently, 
worldview is not just a mere subjective, speculative opinion of the world. 
It presupposes a path of progressive personal integration of knowledge, 
natural science and science of history, and also the highest independent 
activity of the human spirit, whose aim is a coherent whole. The evident 
consequences of insufficient comprehension and familiarity with this 
concept are the following: 1) schools such as generativism would not 
have suffered from the useless hypertrophy that is denounced today 
even by its former strict followers, 2) other orientations in vogue, such 
as what is called cognitive linguistics, which were even before in nuce 
included in the thought of the Sprachphilosophie, of Phenomenology, 
etc., 3) according to the first Prague School, any linguistic structure-
personal or social- in a language is originally a metaphor, consequently 
it is a psychological-aesthetic object which could be either social or 
individual. 
In the theory of knowledge drafted by Martin Heidegger (mainly in 
1927/2006) the hermeneutic circle is presented as the starting point to 
be able to understand the sense relationships in the world. Furthermore, 
this philosopher intended on establishing it in an ontogenetic manner. 
The beginning of the hermeneutic circle is based on a basic, primary 
and original evidence of the truth. In fact, since man has been exactly in 
the truth of his being, he can pose the question about the truth of the 
meaning of the “human being” and expand on it later on. 
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According to this, each statement (Aussage) uttered by an 
individual implies a hermeneutic circle for himself, inasmuch as such a 
statement contains truth as much as knowledge, that is, the truth 
cannot be questioned, since it already has the truth. As a consequence, 
in order to be able to understand the sense relationship in the world, a 
hermeneutic circle must be completed so that a better understanding 
can be drawn. The movement of this circle takes place in such a way 
that the particular can only be understood in relation to the whole, and 
the whole itself can only be shown in the particular/individual. 
Nonetheless, if the understanding process is only feasible within the 
conduit of a circle, then it is really a problem to know where that circle 
must be founded. Heidegger’s solution to this problem is man himself 
since it is he who poses the question of the meaning of “being”. 
The “being” of man/human being is conceived and named by 
Heidegger “being-there” (Dasein, also translated very often as “being in 
the world”), which can only be understood not as a subject-object 
relationship but as the relationship existing between our own existence 
and temporality. This relationship starts as a pre-knowledge of being 
pointed out as knowledge of being (Seinsverständnis). This latter 
knowledge is incumbent on any human being when he understands, for 
instance, the different types of being, inanimate objects, animals, etc. 
These obvious (selbstverständlich) behaviours are based on 
interpretations of the “how” and “what” of things. 
Theory of Language and General Linguistics.  
On the Foundations of the Model “From Speaking to Linguistic Systems” 
 
 
 
 
Lorenzo Hervás Número  2 
Fundamentos del Lenguaje Marzo de 2011 
ISSN 1988-8465 
26  
This basic and essential characteristic is related to the “being 
there” (Dasein). This is why the human being is constantly involved in a 
pre-reflexive horizon of understanding, consequently, Heidegger 
focuses his intellectual work on the concept of “being there”. Through 
this perspective, obviously hermeneutic, Heidegger does not refer to a 
subject who mainly perceives bodies in space and time (as Kant does, 
for instance). The “being there” is even more than that, a “being there” 
who understands, who is permanently integrated in a world. 
What makes Heidegger’s thought particularly interesting for the 
founding of cultural sciences in general and of speaking (el hablar) in 
particular, is that our author chooses not a special “being there” but an 
ordinary one as an access point to the circle. His objective is to rescue 
philosophy from its transcending speculations to the ordinary/usual 
world of experience. 
This is why in Heidegger’s conception, which is very close to 
Husserl’s phenomenology, the following steps can be found: 
1) A first step: how can the “being there” (Dasein) face the 
sense relationships in the world? This question, naturally, has 
as its consequence a phenomenological description. 
2) In a second step, there is an existential analysis of the 
“being there”, that is, investigations of the structures that form 
the “being there”, such as languages, mood (situation), 
understanding and finitude of the “being there”. 
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2.4. CULTURAL PHENOMENON AND SYMBOL. 
The cultural phenomenon is symbolic and as such, phylogenetically 
individual, even though it may also become social. Even in that case, its 
degree of sociability, as with a symbol, depends on the social acceptance, 
i. e. on individual acceptances of such a phenomenon, and it could be 
shown at the most as something assumed by a sum of individual 
freedoms within a specific period of time. 
We will not discuss either the different types of symbol, or the 
Saussurean distinction regarding the difference between sign and 
symbol in which the latter would refer to the non-purely conventional 
sign. This idea goes against the North American semiotic philosopher 
Charles Sanders Peirce‘s conception (see Christian J. W. Kloesel, Peirce 
edition project 1992), for whom a symbol would be, unlike an index or 
icon, a purely conventional sign. As far as we are concerned, we follow 
Ernst Cassirer’s ideas: man is by definition a symbolic animal in the 
sense that he is essentially both a creator and user of symbols. 
According to this German philosopher, man only has relationships with 
reality through symbols, the contents of which are at the same time 
conscious and unconscious, social and individual for the person who 
uses them, just as psychoanalysis supported. So far we can state that 
1) all knowledge, scientific or not, uses symbols, 
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2) when these symbols are linguistic, that is, linguistic signs, then, 
unlike Saussure (see Rudolf Engler, ed., 1968-74, Ferdinand de 
Saussure, Cours de linguistique genérale), we have been stating for 
many years that the only linguistic sign is the syntactic-semantic 
sentence structure pattern. As we will see in other future articles, 
these are structures made up of 1) predicative nucleus; 2) 
eventually, some linguistic variables such as somebody, something, 
somehow, somewhere, at some point, some time, etc. and 3) 
eventually, some prepositions. These structures are semantically 
opposed to the other possible syntactic structures (either to those 
which have the same lexical meaning in the predicative nucleus or 
to those with a different lexical predicative nucleus). 
All the other units which are also called linguistic signs are either 
determiners of all these structures lexically invested or not, or 
determiners of parts of them, that is, subsequent determiners of the 
syntagmas that comprise the sentence structure pattern and/or the 
utterance. 
 Since the syntactic-semantic patterns, which are simultaneously 
units of language and speaking (das Sprechen), are themselves 
intralinguistic units, we humbly believe that we are continuing Wilhelm 
von Humboldt’s, Martin Heidegger’s, Ernst Cassirer’s or Hans-Georg 
Gadamer’s theories. For the aforementioned authors, hat in our theory 
would be called “speaking” as a means of communicating with someone 
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intentionally in an articulate manner according to a system- would be 
the means to think as well as the way to understand and interpret the 
world par excellence. This idea, close to the one presented by W. von 
Humboldt, takes as its origin the fact that language is essential for all 
the other more complex activities as well as for man’s reflective 
processes (Denkvorgänge). Speaking is not an additional and 
subsequent means for understanding between human beings. 
Furthermore, the conception of things and the world’s phenomena is 
already linguistically pre-structured in the speaker’s mind. Things and 
phenomena (Sachverhalte) relate to each other through the linguistic 
conception of the world by means of meaningful relationships 
(Sinnzusammenhänge), without which no other orientation in the world 
would be possible for man. Consequently, he does not live as an animal 
in a world conceived sensitively (sinnlich) in which he makes himself 
understood subsequently, sporadically and occasionally by means of 
speaking. He lives and exists in speaking itself. What makes him a 
human being is the fact that he always puts things in a linguistic 
relationship. This focus or approach primarily goes against the conception 
of language as a mere tool for communication. 
  We are facing a historical phenomenon, and as such, unconcluded, 
and as such, relative, and, consequently modifiable8
                     
8 There are no classical languages, as already stated by José Ortega y Gasset (1940) 
when he held literally that we need a new type of reflection on the Greek and the 
. Does this imply that 
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the explanation of a cultural phenomenon must be historical? It would be 
a contradiction to say that the historical explains itself. The explanation of 
a cultural phenomenon implies the identification of the forms through 
which it is expressed and the search for the contents of consciousness 
associated with such forms. This means that, unlike natural phenomena, 
in which cause and effect occur “outside” the researcher and the cause 
comes before the effect and explains it, in a logical or mathematical 
phenomenon, the elements and construction are “inside” the researcher 
and the derived structure is logically subsequent to what it stems from. 
Finally, in the field of cultural phenomena, the researcher is situated 
simultaneously “inside” and “outside”, that is, what the symbol means and 
the form which means it. The explanation cannot be causal, deductive or 
inductive but, necessarily, oppositive, i.e. a hypothesis must be 
formulated so as to determine which contents of consciousness are 
associated with one form versus the ones associated with the others. 
Nothing before, either temporal or logical, explains what comes later 
logically or temporarily, since between what comes before and what 
comes after is human freedom, essential to the cultural phenomenon. 
 Regardless of the fact that a historical fact cannot be studied 
historically, as this would imply a contradiction, all knowledge is historical 
                                                            
Roman thought, not as models, but on the contrary, as examples of errors. Man is a 
historical being and each historical reality- consequently not definitive- is mainly an 
error. Being historically conscious of oneself and learning to see oneself as an error is 
exactly the same thing. 
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in one way or another. In a cultural science, like the one we are analyzing, 
given the phenomenological complexity of the analyzed object, the human 
being, it is essential to pose the problem of the numerous explanations all 
along history that man has given himself about himself9
 
, i.e. on the 
products of his free intentional and voluntary activity. Hence the historical 
principle. 
3. THE HISTORICAL PRINCIPLE. 
 Ever since Hegel, it is known that all knowledge is historical, and 
consequently, that the history of theory of language and of general 
linguistics (as previous and underlying studies) is also historical. This, of 
course, is if both of them are conceived as sets of organized knowledge 
which present the theories and methods that, in a dialectic opposition, 
have tried to explain the set of peculiar phenomena constituting historical 
languages in their many varieties and manifestations. 
Indeed, Hegel, in his Vorlesungen über die Weltgeschichte 
(1805/06) considers history as a progressive advance in the conscious 
knowledge of freedom (Fortschritt im Bewußtsein der Freiheit). He 
considers world history as the most concrete reality of the spirit 
(konkreteste Wirklichkeit des Geistes) or, eventually, as a representation 
of the spirit (Darstellung des Geistes), that is, how we get to know what 
                     
9 In a Kantian terminology, so to say, we are now dealing with an imperative of pure 
practical reason.  
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we really are ourselves (according to the philosopher from Stuttgart, this 
type of progress is absolutely necessary). 
After this, two great paths of thought opened: 1) the so-called 
“scientific change of history”, and 2) the comparison of 
phenomenological systems (see Cramer, 1984), that is, the history of 
cultural events. The former had a necessary character that history itself 
had taken upon itself to eliminate. The latter is the one that has been 
carried out in the best cultural tradition from Husserl to the present day. 
 That is the reason why, before showing our own perspective, which 
should take us from a theory of speaking (Sprechtheorie) to a specific 
speaking (individual speaking), we must explain our concept of the history 
of linguistic thought. It has become necessary to do so, since all 
researchers refer to one of these dialectic moments, as has been clearly 
stated by psychology, on one hand, and by the general study of symbolic 
forms, on the other. This latter research proves that these do not come 
out of nowhere nor does the scientific reflection on themselves. 
 
3.1. THE BASIC PRINCIPLES. 
 The many aspects dealt with in the study of linguistic phenomena 
do not interfere with the establishment of some basic principles which 
have founded, in one way or another, all linguistic speculations - and also 
speculations about symbolic forms in general- from the first Sanskrit 
grammars to the most recent conceptions which consider speaking and its 
Theory of Language and General Linguistics.  
On the Foundations of the Model “From Speaking to Linguistic Systems” 
 
 
 
 
Lorenzo Hervás Número  2 
Fundamentos del Lenguaje Marzo de 2011 
ISSN 1988-8465 
33  
products as aesthetic systems. These principles or basic aspects can be 
stated as a three-part consideration: 1) the linguistic phenomenon both in 
the act of its production and in the nature of the product itself, 2) the 
systems of units and their underlying rules for speaking and its products 
and 3) speaking as a faculty of man and so, methodologically, as the study 
of this faculty itself, its universally valid principles and rules. 
 This three-sided problem has not been dealt with theoretically until 
very recently, and so we consider a three-part scientific approach to 
speaking and languages/linguistic systems as pertinent: 
1) a historical approach which, dialectically, sets clearly the way in 
which linguistic knowledge is developed in successive theses, 
antitheses and syntheses of methods, theories and schools; 
2) a reflection on the theoretical concepts and methods of the three 
above-mentioned aspects, so that the elements that make a new 
comprehensive synthesis possible may be drafted; and, 
3) the adaptation of these principles to a description of languages in 
their different historic forms under which we can find paradigmatic 
systems and syntagmatic rules that account for speaking itself in a 
dual perspective: synchrony, conceived as something immediate to 
consciousness, and diachrony, relation with other structures not 
immediate to the present consciousness of the speaker and/or 
researcher. 
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3.2. THE INSTRUMENTAL CHARACTER OF THE DICHOTOMY SYNCHRONY 
/DIACHRONY. 
As far as synchrony and diachrony are concerned, we must insist 
once more that they are exclusively instrumental concepts since the 
speaking products themselves, as they are unique and unrepeatable, 
cannot be synchronic or diachronic- both synchrony and diachrony just 
refer to the researcher’s perspective. That is, when he interprets a 
specific product, he can do it by either considering this product as one 
more within a series of products that have preceded it but have not 
caused it, or by trying to interpret it from his consciousness as a 
speaker or from his informants’ consciousness of what he is using or 
may be using. Synchrony is not a system in a point in time because that 
point neither exists nor can exist. Diachrony is not the evolution of 
speaking because man cannot understand evolution itself, but only the 
comparison between states of consciousness from different periods of 
time. In any event, such comparison cannot be based on precise time 
delineations since the ontogenetic and phylogenetic states of 
consciousness are in continuous flux, as is the case with their creators, 
man and society. Consequently, and in complete agreement with the 
master from Tübingen, E. Coseriu, when we study a product of speaking 
we are researching an object individually elaborated, which does not 
have any systematic unity. Instead, corresponding to a state of things 
which relates to a variety or architecture of systems (E. Coseriu, 
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1970/73, p. 27), that is, to a diasystem that is split or divided into the 
spatial field (diatopic), the sociocultural (diastratic) and stylistic 
(diaphasic). 
On the other hand, this last interpretative consciousness of the 
speaker (and the researcher) works synchronically but is formed both 
ontogenetically and phylogenetically in the diachrony of the individual 
and of society, i.e., in the change that both individual and society 
essentially imply. 
Regardless of these considerations in which the opposition 
synchrony / diachrony is stated as a terminological category, not of the 
object of study but of the researcher’s point of view, the current 
diachronic linguistics is far from achieving a theoretical status which 
may be sufficient. In fact, specialists of current diachronic linguistics, 
sometimes without knowing if they refer to the whole or to a part of it, 
present many different objects of study which do not form a coherent 
theory: phonetic change, lexical change, linguistic change, semantic 
change, syntactic change, analogical changes, linguistic classification, 
ecological linguistics, philology, history of language, areal linguistics, 
comparative method, models of linguistic change, linguistic prehistory, 
loan, inner reconstruction, linguistic reconstruction, genetic distance 
relationships, and so on. 
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3.3. DIALECTICS OF LINGUISTIC SPECULATION. 
 Today there are many treatises on the history of the scientific study 
of language in general and historical languages10 in particular, especially 
from ancient Greek speculation to the present time. On the other hand, 
there are very few of them that try to give any kind of unity to a historical 
study which is presented in many cases, more than as historical (historisch 
in the sense of Schleiermacher: producing effects of which one has 
cultural consciousness), that is, as an impetus for what comes later, rather 
than as something merely successive (geschichtlich: what comes first in 
time but without any causal or motivational link with it). This is the reason 
why we have gone back to Hegel who, as it is widely known, bases on his 
Vorlesungen über die Weltgeschichte11
                     
10 Although it is not necessary, at least in relative terms, we would like to state that 
neither the history of scientific study of language in general nor the history of the 
scientific study of historical languages is part of the synchronic or diachronic study of any 
language. Once again, we are looking at a matter of the philosophy of science. 
 all specifically human evolution. 
11 V. Báez would like to thank his first teacher Prof. Emeritus Dr. D. Antonio Gómez 
Moriana (Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, Canada), who, more than fifty years ago, 
knew how to awake an interest in the explanation of cultural phenomena, beyond just 
memorizing things, in a young person of the 1950’s, in a village high school. Dr. 
Gómez Moriana taught his pupils how to study and pose problems. Later, V. Báez had 
the privilege and honor to study with him as his teacher again, in the fullest sense of 
the term in the Romance Languages Seminar of the Ruhr Universität, Bochum. By then, 
Professor Gómez Moriana, with two doctorates, was one of the most respected, 
admired and feared participants in that seminar. His work was the one of a titan: Atlas. 
During V. Báez’s adolescence, Dr. Gómez Moriana introduced him to Hegelian 
philosophy and helped him understand the Spanish Renaissance and Baroque. Nothing 
was explained either in Spain, Italy or Germany which would improve upon his schemas 
or their content. 
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This is a dialectic conception which goes from what he calls the Eastern 
world to his time and runs on two dialectically opposed axes: 
idealism/realism. This conception has structured all our intellectual 
formation for more than a century. There is still no better explanation 
and, furthermore, it is still valid. Starting from this dialectic structure, we 
are now going to describe, in a totally schematic way, what is called the 
history of linguistic thought as an opposition between two main axes: the 
speculation about the essence of language and the speculation about its 
development, which are terms related to the above-mentioned axes 
(being and becoming). 
  In the Greek, Latin and medieval periods, the study of language was 
theoretically conceived as a descriptive general grammar. It tried to define 
its units within a logicist and philosophical framework leaving the 
historical phenomena aside. This linguistic description also had a 
practical, philological objective. Preeminence was given to the written text; 
consequently, the main objective was to transmit and interpret it correctly. 
  As opposed to this general perspective in ancient times and the 
Middle Ages, from the Renaissance to the 17th century, etymology, history 
of language and comparative grammar are dealt with for the first time in 
history. Initial approaches to the later called phonetic law as well as to 
substrate and language mixtures are made at this time as well. 
 In the 17th and 18th centuries, rationalism focuses again on the 
essence of language, since its study was conceived as a speculation 
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providing the foundation for a general descriptive grammar. This point of 
view was going to vary considerably in the 19th century due to the 
resurgence of an essentially historicist perspective. This viewpoint arises, 
on the one hand, from the philosophical conception of that century 
(positivism and historicism, the latter being immanent in the Hegelian 
dialectics) and on the other, from the discovery of other languages related 
to the European ones, such that gradually the relatedness and genealogy 
of Indo-European languages and other families of genetically associated 
languages12
  Diverging from these historicist trends, the 20th century returned to 
the essence of language in its two main aspects: general linguistics and 
descriptive linguistics. 
 could be presented as a major achievement. 
  We will focus now on the contemporary linguistic movements from 
the end of the 19th century to the present day. Once again, the opposition 
                     
12 In this last field, Lorenzo Hervás was the forerunner and most important 
representative: his linguistic works, with a deep ethnological, ethnographic and 
anthropological sense, improved upon all preceding works in vision and depth and 
were praised by Wilhelm von Humboldt, Johann Severin Vater and Johann Christoph 
Adelung, Max Müller and mainly, by Otto Jespersen. By all this, he was called the Father 
of Comparative Linguistics, after he announced: “a language is a vision of the world or 
a vision of reality.” The establishment of the Indo-European family, the relationship 
between Greek and Sanskrit, the classification of Hebrew as a Semitic language, the 
scientific demonstration of Basque-Iberism, the establishment of two new language 
families: the Malayan-Polynesian and the Finnish-Hungarian, the importance given to 
grammar and morphology to decide the relatedness of languages (as Leibniz had 
already stated), the calling for direct data or linguistic data obtained by missionaries in 
the study of American Indian as well as Insulindian languages, all these place Lorenzo 
Hervás in front of most of his contemporaries, at least, for a century. 
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would be dialectic, between the terms analytic-synthetic. 
 If we consider the cultural cycle from Greek thought to the 18th 
century, we can define this long period as a synchretic age in language 
sciences. We can do so even though in some specific period speculation 
on the essence of language or its development may have predominated, 
analysis and synthesis were still two possible complementary research 
tendencies. Furthermore, the rationalist interest in the essence of 
language does not deny the historicist achievements of the historical 
thought of the Renaissance, nor does the latter’s historicist worries 
question the utility and necessity of the theories on the nature/essence of 
language established by the ancients and the medievals. These periods 
can only be interpreted as successively emphasizing one problem or 
another. 
 With the historic positivism of the 19th century, an analytical stage 
of language sciences would develop through the first third of the 20th 
century. This analytical conception all along the 19th century is based on 
the positivist principle of the lack of distinction between natural and 
cultural phenomena. This implies that linguistic occurrences were 
explained experimentally on the basis of a causality principle; 
consequently there was an analytical and inductive conception which 
attempted to explain linguistic phenomena biologically, psychologically 
Theory of Language and General Linguistics.  
On the Foundations of the Model “From Speaking to Linguistic Systems” 
 
 
 
 
Lorenzo Hervás Número  2 
Fundamentos del Lenguaje Marzo de 2011 
ISSN 1988-8465 
40  
and especially historically13
1) carry out a series of observations; 
, so that, as happens with natural occurrences, 
the procedure would be: 
2) establish their general properties, and 
3) state a series of characteristics as a general or even universal law, 
as long as the existence of other facts which demand a different 
characterization do not make a different hypothesis necessary. 
As a consequence, a scientific relativism inherent to the study of natural 
phenomena was established as a guideline for the study of cultural 
occurrences, among which historical languages have a prominent 
position. 
 This positivist conception was going to be disrupted by the coming 
of European linguistic structuralism which, still within an analytical stage 
in the research of the linguistic phenomenon, was going to set the 
grounds for a contraposition to the previous stage, all in an anti-positivist 
and anti-historicist sense. Therefore, unlike 19th-century linguistics, 20th-
century European structuralism and its later schools are determined by the 
following characteristics, as pointed out magnificently by E. Coseriu 
(1968): anti-historicism, anti-naturalism, systematicism and anti-
substantialism. 
 A special mention should be made to generativism and post-
                     
13 Historicity should be conceived as geschichtlich (material, successive, not 
interpretative) and not historisch (formal, not merely successive, interpretative). 
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generativism (see V. Báez San José, 1975, § 9.0. Conclusiones, pp. 298-
320), especially what is called cognitive linguistics. Its followers, since 
they have never distinguished cultural and natural phenomena, are, to a 
certain extent, immersed in the 19th-century scientific philosophy. In 
this instance, though, they are not looking for a historical explanation of 
phenomena but are posing, at least in their more recent models, not the 
discovery of units and relationships but, strictly, pure and simple 
formalization, if we understand this as a principle of their explanation. 
The aforementioned researchers are, at best, synchretic, or what would 
commonly be called healthy eclecticism. 
 In fact, more recently, some dissatisfied generativist linguists of 
the 1980s such as George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1980), Ronald 
Langacker (1987 and 1991), George Lakoff (1987), G. Fauconnier 
(1985/1994) and in collective works like Rudzka-Ostyn (ed.) (1988) and 
E. Casad (ed.) (1996), many of whom were followers of generative 
semantics (see V. Báez, 1973), did not criticize the validity of the 
generativist models, but rather their precariousness. This was because, 
as they stated, these models did not have the necessary means or 
resources. For this reason, in a new integrated model, cognitive 
grammar incorporated a series of extra-linguistic perspectives - 
lingüistics + psychology, lingüistics + anthropology, lingüistics + 
neurology …, or all of these together -. This cognitive grammar stated 
that, unlike the autonomous generative theory of language, the above-
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mentioned sciences had something in common with linguistics: both of 
them agreed that language had two main cognitive capacities: 
categorization and the processes of metaphor and metonymy. 
It is evident that these authors state that they work on hypotheses 
which are radically different from the ones of generative grammar but, 
at least as far as our own research from 1973 is concerned, we can state 
that we have never seen any difference between the two linguistic 
trends, transformational and cognitive grammar, but just the fact that 
the latter added some extra elements or considerations. In fact, some 
qualified psychologist psycholinguists call themselves cognitivists like 
the authors Michael Tomasello, Raymond Gibbs, Lera Boroditsky, 
Michael Ramscar, Michael Spivey, Seana Coulson, Teenie Matlock, 
Benjamin Bergen, Benjamín Alonso and Fernanda Alonso, on the one 
hand and David McNeill, on the other. There are also software 
engineers, such as Jerome Feldman, Terry Regier and Srinivas 
Narayanan. We can also find propaedeutic introductions to the cognitive 
grammar by Gilles Fauconnier, and other widely-quoted studies such as 
those by J. E. Grady, T. Oakley, y S. Coulson (1999), F. Ungerer and H. J. 
Schmid (1996/2006), G. Fauconnier (1997), J. R. Taylor (2002), W. Croft 
y D. A. Cruse (2004), M. Tomasello, M. (2003), E. Vyvyan Evans, 
Benjamin K. Bergen and J. Zinken (2007) and T. Rohrer (2007), all of 
whom add many different points of view. 
 In any event, the reading of these works, to which we could add 
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some other important Spanish authors such as M. J. Cuenca and J. Hilferty 
(1999), J. L. Cifuentes Honrubia (1994), C. Inchaurralde and I. Vázquez 
(2000), A. Castañeda (1997) and A. López García (2004) only show the 
tendency to construct an integrating linguistics which, furthermore, 
already existed since the 18th-century and 19th-century German 
Sprachphilosohie. If not what would the Schleiermacher’s theory of the 
circle of understanding, which has been developed in this article, be? Or, 
for that matter Karl Bühler’s theory on the functions of speech 
(Sprechfunktionen and never Sprachfunktionen)? What would be the works 
of the Russian linguist R. Jakobson, cofounder of the Linguistic School of 
Prague, on metaphor, metonomy and generalization on linguistic learning 
masterfully presented in his work Kindersprache und Aphasie? They are an 
attempt at a synthesis, not a mere addition of parts. Jakobson begins by 
saying that speaking is the first metaphorical and/or metonymic and/or 
generalizing knowledge, and that consequently all speaking is poetic. 
Thus, being poetry at the level of the particular, it is also individual poetry 
accomplished with an instrument which is poetic at the social level. 
 It is true that the collapse of the strict boundary between science 
and humanities has been essential to unite researchers from both fields. 
They were as distant and uncomfortable with the other side as the 
citizens of Berlin were before the fall of the Wall. It is not enough to say 
that there is not any border; it has to be clearly stated that there are 
sciences, all of them logical, but divided into natural, cultural and 
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formalization sciences. All scientific progress moves from the plural to 
the singular in a new theory and this is precisely what we cannot see in 
cognitivists, since they consider, generally speaking, the formal object 
of the sciences to be an additive set of raw perspectives with no 
connection between them. From our point of view, somebody not able to 
differentiate may end in confusion. 
 We are, therefore, after the generativist brilliance-an inevitable 
corrective for having laid aside a millennium’s philosophical tradition- 
standing before a stage which can again be called synchretic. In fact, we 
are before a theory which is conceived as coherent, even though no one or 
a very few may consider the validity of its principles, and it is called 
coherent because of its “polyhedral vision” of facts and analyses-, as many 
pretentious scholars currently assert. We have not yet seen that such 
analytical stances, called complementary because they mix different 
sciences, pose any of the following questions: 1) What is its place within 
the philosophy of science? 2) What is the most essential aspect of a 
combined treatment? 3) What is the reason for this treatment? and 4) How 
may a new science uniting these attempts emerge from them? 
 
4. CONCLUSION. 
  Our methodological procedure has followed the path of the circle 
of understanding of the German hermeneutics: the first formalized 
perception was the 2002 model, its confrontation of the data from the 
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German, Spanish and English languages has been the revealing factor 
which has made us clarify our conception of particles and of temporal 
markers of discourse. On the eve of the publication of several works on 
the temporally and the logically prior - cause, condition, concession- and 
the subsequent -consequence- to the utterance, we have again posed the 
foundations of our practical research within the field of general linguistics. 
This linguistics is necessarily comparative, according to Georg von der 
Gabelentz’s thought, which has given us, at this second beginning of the 
circle, a deeper perspective on the concepts of theoretical linguistics, 
general linguistics, philosophical principles and historical principles. 
 Theoretical linguistics is not a branch of linguistics but, as we have 
seen, part of the theory of science, gnoseology, which tells us where our 
research, according to its essence, is placed: 
A) within the field of cultural sciences 
B) within the field of symbolic elements, 
C) within the field of linear symbolic elements, and 
D) within certain systems composed of some units whose main core 
is the sentence structure pattern completed in meaning, sense 
and reference by other lesser possible levels: 
   i) that of universal paralinguistic sounds, 
ii) that of systematic linguistic sounds which show different 
diaphasies, diastraties and diatopies, 
iii) that of diasystematic linguistic sounds, 
Theory of Language and General Linguistics.  
On the Foundations of the Model “From Speaking to Linguistic Systems” 
 
 
 
 
Lorenzo Hervás Número  2 
Fundamentos del Lenguaje Marzo de 2011 
ISSN 1988-8465 
46  
iv) that of phonemes and glides as units which help to 
distinguish meanings, 
v) words as minimum syntagms, and 
vi) groups of words, possible units in many languages (pre-
predicative syntagms, as the School of Prague already foresaw 
in the 1930s). 
 Starting from the speech event as the only true reality in historic 
speech, we face the problem that it may and does have a two-sided 
abstract treatment which may form dialectically, however, specific units: 
utterance and sentence structure patterns. 
  As far as speaking itself is concerned, the dialogue, a reality 
contained in the definition of speaking, communicating with someone 
intentionally in an articulate manner, we note that an utterance, in 
accordance with the unities that determine it, can be formed with 
interventions and these can also constitute a text. It must also be taken 
into account that utterance, intervention and text may coincide. 
  The philosophical principle has placed before our eyes: a) the 
aforementioned classification of sciences, b) Dilthey’s original concept of 
a hermeneutic circle, with Schleiermacher’s contributions and, principally, 
the often-quoted Heideggerian “Dasein” and c) out of the discussion of 
motivation/immotivation, conventionality/unconventionality of signs, we 
have focused on delimiting the most important linguistic sign: the 
sentence structure pattern. We have also focused on the emphasis given 
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by Ernst Cassirer to the fact that man is a symbolic animal in the sense 
that he is a never-ending creator of symbols, out of which the most 
important ones are the above-mentioned sentence structure patterns, as 
opposed to the existing ones in all possible semiotic systems. 
 Finally, incorporating Hegel’s thought in his Vorlesungen über die 
Weltgeschichte, we have come to recognize that speculation about the 
essence of language continues to be part of our culture 1) from the Greek 
thought to the beginning of the 20th century we find a chain of theses and 
antitheses ruled by the opposition between pairs, speculation on the 
essence of languages /on their development and 2) a new branch of 
linguistic speculation arises since the end of the 20th century in Germany 
and later in France. It is ruled by the opposition between a) the 19th-
century positivism characteristic of natural and cultural sciences, b) 
structuralism and its anti-historicist and anti-positivist principles, and 
from this, the alternation between inductive and deductive movements in 
accordance with the aforementioned Bochensky. 
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